LBT230-232永恆

LBT230-232永恆

撰寫人：9580054 梁永恆

The pages：230 ~ 232

In man, the ability to acquire language appears to be relatively independent of his own ability to “solve problems,” that is, of his type of “nonspecific intelligence.” Why Should we, therefore, expect that an animal’s ability to solve human problems is relevant to his ability to acquire verbal behavior? In most animals the “cognitive strategy” for solving a given problem is quite different from that used by man(Uexkull,1921).

It may seem as if the cross-species comparisons of cognitive function and behavior by Harlow(1949 and 1958), Schrier et al.(1965), David D. Smith(1965), and by Rensch(1959,1964) and their students were contradictions to our assertions. Actually these findings are not contrary evidence, but they are not relevant to language acquisition, however. Let us picture the various skills that are relevant to communication as overlapping maps such as those shown in Fig6.4. There are some common skills as well as specializations. Let us assume that man’s language is closely tied to his cognitive structure. We might diagram the cognitive structures of other animals also as overlapping but not coterminous maps so that each has its own peculiar deviation. Suppose that language is in that part of man’s cognitive realmwhich most diverges from the “common region.” We see that it may take more that overlap to be capable of learning to speak.

(2)Continuity Theory B: Straight-Line Evolution of Complexity by Stepwise Accretion(with Missing Links)

Proponents of theories of this type admit of qualitative differences between human and animal communication, but they also believe that the extant communication behavior of animals has a discernible and continuous history. Language is seen as a

complex of more or less independent features, each with its own history. In the course of evolution, more and more features developed and were added to the structure of communication behavior but, because of the various fates of individual species and phylogenetic off-shoots, there are a number of “missing links” or empty cells, So to speak, as diagrammed in Fig. 6.2. Thus, we find zoologists who are concerned with what they consider to be the biological prerequisites for speech and language, to search for each of these prerequisites independently throughout the animal kingdom. For instance, O. Koehler(1951, 1952, 1954-a, and 1954-b) believes that there are at least nineteen biological prerequisites for language. Due to felicitous circumstances all of these nineteen prerequisites are present in man. Except for one or two, the prerequisites are common zoological characteristics which man has preserved owing to his animal nature. No lower animal is endowed even with all those prerequisites that are not specifically human. A given species may have just a few of them—not enough to learn to understand or to speak—whereas a few species have so many of the prerequisites that they are either able to reach lowest stage of human language-learning(parrots), or engage in behavior that is an excellent parallel of human language(such as v. Frisch’s honey bees).Koehler proposes that one of the first prerequisites of language is the existence of

concepts (unbenanntes Denken), that is, un-named thoughts. In a great number of experiments he has shown that many birds and mammals are capable of “counting” at least to three and many up to seven or even eight but none beyond. This suggests to Koehler that a number-concept is present and that this concept is practically universal among higher animals have unbenanntes Denken according to Koehler Man has a peculiar skill in attaching symbols or names to these concepts which Koehler considers to be the essence of language. But he feels that even in this skill man is not totally alone. Parrots can also name concepts, that is, are supposedly able to learn the meaning of a few words; and rudiments of the same skill are also seen by Koehler in aspects of the bees’ communication system.Speech-motor skills are innate in man, but biologically they are no innovation because some animals can learn to say things. Also the ontogenetic development of vocalizations in man has parallels in birds; just as birds go through characteristic song-stages after hatching, human infants go through characteristic stages of vocalization. Koehler explains the onset of words by an essential law of effect. The infant notices the results or effects of his crying and babbling and thus begins to make use of these vocalizations in order to bring about certain consequences. The early history of vocalizations and the beginning of language, he thinks, are identical with developments in certain birds, and are thereby evidence for the biological nature of these phenomena. Man and his language differ from animals and their communication (1) by degree of certain universal skills, particularly a nonspecific learning ability, and (2) by accretion of new skills such as man’s ability to combine and permute the named concepts, that is, words. So much about Koehler’s views.

【翻譯】

在人類之中，獲得語言的能力是與解決問題的獨立能力有關，也就是“非特定智慧”的類型，是我們應該學會的原因，所以，預期動物解決人類問題就是與獲得口語行為有關嗎?在大多數動物解決問題的認知策略是不同於人類所用的，它可以視為好像由Harlow，Schrier et al.，David D. Smith，Rensch和他們的學生以認知功能和行為的誇物種比較來反駁我們的主張，事實上，這些發現不是對立的證據，但他們是與語言的習得無關，無論如何，讓我們用圖表示不同的技能，而這些技能看作為相交重疊的地圖而與溝通有關，如圖Fig6.4所示，也有一些普通技能是特殊化，我們假設人類的語言是與其認知結構緊密聯系，我們可以描繪其他動物的認知結構為重疊的，但不是相連接的地圖，所以每一種都有它自己特定的偏差，假設語言是人類認知領域的一部份，這部份大多數在一般區域就有所差異，社會理論B:逐步增加複雜的直線進化理論的支持者承認人類和動物的溝通在這類型的性質不同，但他們亦相信現存的動物溝通行為是有一個可辨別和連續的歷史。語言是被看成為一個帶有或多或少獨立特徵的綜合體，各自有一個它自己的歷史。在進化的過程中，越來越多的特徵發展出來以及是加入到溝通行為的結構中，但因為各種各樣的個體物種和種系發生的中斷，有許多缺失的連接和空的細胞，如圖Fig6.2所示。因此，我們發現動物學家是關注於他們所考慮的對於言語及語言生物學上的先決條件，為此在遍及整個生物領域中找尋這些每一個獨立的先決條件。例如：O. Koehler 相信對於語言至少有十九種生物學上的先決條件。由於適當的環境，所有這些十九種先決條件都在人類中呈現出來。除了一或兩種，由于他的動物自然界這些普通的動物學上的特徵被人類保留下來。除了特定為人類，沒有其他較低等的動物是被賦與任何那些先決條件，一個種族可以有其中一些──不足以學習去理解或講話──然而一些種族因有這些先決條件而他們或者能達到人類最低的語言學習階段(鸚鵡式仿說)，或參與一個完全等同於人類語言行為。(例如v. Frisch的蜂蜜蜜蜂理論)Koehler主張其中一個最初的語言先決條件是存在的概念，那是，非命名的想法。在多數的實驗中他顯示出很多鳥類和哺乳動物是能夠計算至少三個及多到七個或甚至八個但不能再多了。這啟發Koehler了數量概念的出現以及這概念實際上在有unbenanntes Denken的較高等動物中是普遍的，透過Koehler的理論，人類有一個罕有的技能是使這些Koehler考慮為語言的本質的概念附有象徵和名字。但他感覺到這技能人類並不是獨一無二的。鸚鵡亦能命名概念，那是，大概能夠學習一些詞的意思；以及亦都在Koehler的蜜蜂溝通系統看到初步的相同技能言語運動技能是人類天生的，但生物學上他們並沒有創新，因為一些動物能夠學習說話，人類中發聲法的個體發展是與鳥類平行；就好像鳥類在孵化後經歷特有的唱歌階段，人類嬰兒則經歷特有的發聲法階段。Koehler解釋詞的開始是依從一個基本規律。嬰兒注意到他的哭喊和咿啞學語的結果或作用，因此為了產生特定結果，便開始利用這些發聲。發聲的早期歷史和語言的開始，他想，是與某一個鳥類發展相同，從而作為這些在自然界生物學上現象的證據。人類和他的語言是不同於動物和他們的溝通因特定的共有技能的程度，特別一個非特殊的學習能力，及因例如人類組合和序列改變已命名概念的新技能增長那是，詞。和Koehler的看法差不多。