LBT332-333志岳

LBT332-333志岳

撰寫人：9580051 李志岳

The pages：332~ 333

This paragraph begins with pag.331: (know why I want you to turn in this assignment to your group leader and check for the completeness and smooth continuity of your assignments now?)

In summary, most animals organize the sensory world by ….are usually called concept-formation; but it is clear that there is no formal difference between man’s concept-formation and animal’s propensity for responding to categories of stimuli. There is, however, a substantive difference. The total possibilities for categorization are clearly not identical across species.

概念形成；但是在人的概念形成和動物的反應刺激類別的傾向之間沒有正式的區別是確切的。有，然而，一個本質區別。總可能性為範疇清楚地不是相同的橫跨種類。

(1) Words as Labels for Categorization Process

The words that constitute the dictionary of a natural language are a sample of labels of categories natural to our species; they are not tags of specific objects. When names have unique referents, such as Michelangelo, Matterhorn, Waterloo, they may be incorporated into discourse but are not considered part of the lexicon. Thus most words may be said to label realms of concept rather than physical things. This must be true for otherwise we should have great difficulty in explaining why words refer to open classes. We cannot define the category labeled house by enumerating all objects that are given that name. Any new object that satisfies certain criteria (and there is an infinity of such objects) may be assigned that label. It is easier to say what such criteria are not than to say what they are. They are not a finite set of objectively measurable variables such as physical dimensions, texture, color, acidity, etc. (except for a few words, which constitute a special case; these will be discussed under the heading “The Language of Experience”). We cannot predict accurately which object might be named house and which not by looking only at the physical measurements of those objects. Therefore, categorization and the possibility of word word-assignment must usually be founded on something more abstract.

(1) 詞作為標籤為範疇過程

構成一種自然語言的字典的詞對於我們種類是自然分類的標籤樣本；他們不是特殊物品的標籤。當名字有獨特的指示對象，就像米開朗基羅，馬特洪峰，滑鐵盧，他們也許被合併論述但不被認為是詞彙的一部份。因此大部分的辭彙被說來標示概念的範圍而不是物理事情。這必須是正確的否則我們會有很大的困難來解釋為什麼詞提到開放類。我們無法定義類別由列舉標記房子藉由被給名字的所有物件。滿足某些標準的任一個新對象(和那裡是無限的這樣對象) 也許被分配那個標籤。說什麼標準不比說他們是什麼更加容易。他們不是有限套客觀地可測量的可變物譬如實體尺寸, 紋理、顏色、酸度, 等。(除了幾個詞, 構成一種特殊情況; 這些將在標題之下"經驗語言"被談論)。我們無法確切的預期哪一個物品會被命名為房子並且不是只有由看那些物品的物理測量。所以, 範疇詞與詞配對的可能性通常必須建立在更抽象的事上。

The infant who is given a word and has the task of finding the category labeled by this word does not seem to start with a working hypothesis that a specific, concrete object(his father) uniquely bears the name daddy; instead, initially the word appears to be used as the label of a general and open category, roughly corresponding to the adult category people or men. Thus categorization by a principle, or the formation of an(abstract) concept is apparently prior to and more primitive than the association of a sound pattern with a specific sensory experience. The same thing may be expressed in different words; stimulus generalization is prior to stimulus discrimination.

被給一個詞並且有一個藉由這個詞來找分類標籤的任務的嬰兒似乎不是開始以明確的，具體的東西(他的爸爸)獨特的承擔命名爸爸的可行的假說；反而，最初這詞的出現被用來作為將軍的標籤和打開類別，大體上相當於成人類別人民或人。因而藉由原則範疇或一個(抽象的)概念的形成顯然地比有具體知覺經驗的聲音樣式協會在先和原始。同樣事也許被表達用不同的詞; 刺激概念化是在刺激辨識之前。

Let us consider more closely the process of categorization that underlies semantics. Is it possible to characterize this cognitive activity any further? For instance, if the classification criteria are not usually physical dimensions, what are they? The most outstanding feature of the “criteriality” is its great flexibility. Sometimes the criterion is primarily one of “use that man makes of the objects”; sometimes it is a given aspect ; sometimes a certain emotional state that all objects in that class may elicit in the viewer. Any one category is not definable by only one, consistently applied criterion. For instance, the word house is usually applicable to structures that serve as shelter for men, animals, or objects. But the criterion for categorizing is frequently changed by metaphorical or quasi-metaphorical extensions, as in House of Lords, house of cards, house of God, the house of David, etc. The ease with which the criterion for categorization may be changed and the naturalness with which we understand such extensions point to the fact that categorization is a creative process of cognitive organization rather than an arbitrary convention. It is precisely due to the absence of rigidly adhered to classification criteria that not only the physical world can be grouped and the groups named, but the classification criteria may be bent, stretched, and altered to include virtual figments, that is, physically nonexisting entities, resulting in words without reference(or obvious referents), but which label a concept(for example, the word ghost). The procedure also makes possible the development of the meaning of the word times in the phrase four times five.

讓我們嚴密考慮強調語義學範疇的過程。它有可能更進一步描繪這認知活動嗎? 例如, 如果分類標準通常不是實體尺寸, 他們是什麼?”標準”最卓著的特點是它偉大的靈活性。有時標準主要是”用人當作受詞”之一；有時這是一個指定的方面；有時所有對象在那類也許得出在觀察者的某一精神狀態。任何一個類別不是下只由一個下定義的，一致地應用的標準。例如，房子一詞通常被適用於提供人，動物，或對象避難所的結構。但分類標準是由隱喻或是類似隱喻延伸的頻率上的改變，就像上議院，用紙牌搭成的房子，上帝房子，大衛房子..等。標準為範疇也許被改變的不拘束並且我們了解延自然性伸指出範疇是認知組織的一個創造性的過程而不是一次任意大會。它精確地歸結於缺乏剛性地遵守分類標準不僅物理世界可以被編組和組別的命名，但是分類標準也許會彎曲，被書展，和被修改包括真正想像的事情，即，完全非存在的個體，造成標記一個概念的詞沒有參考(或明顯的指示物)，例如，但是(字詞鬼)。這過程也可能次數這字詞在慣用語的意思發展成四乘五。

The abstractness underlying meanings in general, which has been the focus of so much philosophizing since antiquity, may best be understood by considering concept-formation the primary cognitive process, and naming (as well as acquiring a name) the secondary cognitive process. Concepts are superimpositions upon the physically given; they are modes of ordering or dealing with sensory data. They are not so much the product of man’s cognition, but conceptualization is the cognitive process itself. Although this process is not peculiar to man (because it essentially results from the mode of operation of a mechanism that can only respond in limited ways to a wide variety of a inputs), man has developed the behavioral peculiarity of attaching words to certain types of concept formation. The words(which persist through time because they may be repeated) make the underlying conceptualization process look much more static than it actually is, as we shall demonstrate presently. Cognition must be the psychological manifestation of a physiological process. It does not appear to be a mosaic of static concept, or a storehouse of thoughts, or an archive of memorized sense-impressions. The task of cognitive organization never comes to an end and is never completed” in order to be used later.” Words are not the labels of a categorization process or family of such processes. Because of the dynamic nature of the underlying process, the referents of words can so easily change, meanings can be extended, and categories are always open. Words tag the processes by which the species deals cognitively with its environment.

This paragraph ends on page 334.

一般來說抽象基本的意思，從古代就已經是理性思考的焦點，藉由概念形成主要過程和(並且獲取名字)命名次要認知過程最被了解。概念是疊加在實際上的規定的；他們是命令和處理知覺數據的方法。他們沒有很多人的認知產品，但是概念化是他自己的認知過程。這個過程對人來說不是奇怪的(因為它本質上起因於只回應各式各樣輸入的有限的機械式運作方式)，人發展了關於某些概念形成類型的附有詞的行為特性。字詞(哪些因為也許被重覆而通過時間堅持的)使淺在的概念化過程看起來比它實際上更神色靜態，因為我們目前將展示。認知必須是一個生理過程的心理顯示。它似乎不是靜態概念的馬賽克或思想的倉庫或者被記住的感覺印象檔案。認知組織任務從未結束並且從未是完整" 為了以後將使用」。詞不是範疇過程或家庭的標籤的這樣過程。 因為基本過程的動態性質，指示物……………(Translate the complete paragraph)!