(each point represents a different shade of color)is coverd by this word.
However, only some points are felt to be "good reds," other points are more
orangy reds or brownish reds. That means that the map or region of the word
red has a focus or center (points that are the most typical examples of the
word red) and that the borders of the map are never sharp; they fade out and
are overlapped by at least one, usually several other word maps.
It's difficult to visualize the fourth dimension of probability in the
three-dimensional maps of words inside the color space. But the over-lapping,
encompassing, and subdividing nature of the probabilistic gradients of name
maps is clearly seen if one takes out of the color space a linear array of
colors (for example,stimuli that vary only in hueholding brightness and saturation)
so as to produce a unidimensional subsample of the color-space, and then maps
the vocabulary on to this continuum as shown in Fig.8.4. The procedure for
obtaining this map was that of Approach B. Notic that there are certain colors which all subjects call by essentially the same name whereas other colors are sometimes called by this and sometimes by that name. Colors Nos. 4 and 13 in Fig. 8.4 were given so many individual names that it was not possible to represent them all by a distinct curve.
Thus, when words are mapped into a referent space, a porbabilistic variable emerges that we might call name-determinacy. The loci in the referent space vary with regard to the name-determinacy. The determinacy is greatest in the center of the foci and decreases centrifugally from these points; it is lowest at the intercept of name-maps. The region which appeared to be “innominate” under Approach A is one of great and widespread name-indeterminacy. Name-determinacy is, of course, a social phenomenon.
The procedures outlined here are a convenient way of demonstrating some of the semantic difference between languages. For instance, color name maps have been worked out for Zuni (Lenneberg and Roberts, 1956) and partially for Navaho (Landar et al., 1960) and Conklin (1955) adopted the Lenneberg-Roberts technique for the study of Hanunoo color categories.
This type of empirical reserch on semantic relationships in various languages can only be carried out within a very small part of the total vocabulary of a language, namely only on the language of experience. Therefore, it is not possible to varify empirically the far-reaching claims that have been made about the “total incomparability of semantics” among unrelated languages. The languages investigated all have names for colors and apart from finding mergers of two of our English color maps into one, or the substructuring of one of our maps, or shifts in border lines nothing particularly astonishing has been discovered. We gather that man, everywhere, can make reference to colors and communicate about color fairly efficiently.
(4) Contextual Determinants in Common Naming
The insight gained through the application of Approach B still gives an inaccurate picture of how the naming of phenomena proceeds. The structure of the name-maps might induce us to believe that the English word red can only be used for a very few colors ( the focus of the region “red” ); and that as we move away from the focus the word would always have to be qualified as for instance yellowish-red, dirty red, etc.However, when one refers to the color of hair, or the color of a cow, or the skin color of the American Indian the word red is used without qualifiers. Conversely, the physical color which is named brownish-orange when it appears in the Munsell Book of Colors, and red when it is the color of a cow, may be called ochre when it appears on the walls of a Roman Villa.
Quite clearly the choice of a name depends on the context, on the number of distinctions that must be made in a particular situation, and on many other factors that have little to do with the semantic structure of a given language per se; for example, the speaker’s intent, the type of person he is addressing himself to or the nature of the social occasion may easily affect the choice of a name.
Only proper names are relatively immune from these extra-linguistic determining factors. But although the attachment of the name Albert Einstein to one particular person remain completely constant. It implies that in instances such as these the most characterisyic aspect of language is eliminated, namely the creative versatility ─the dynamics─and it may well be due to this reduction that proper names are not ” felt” to be part of a natural language. Once more we see that threre are usually no direct associative bonds between words and physical objects.
It is also possible to study empirically the naming behavior that is specific to a given physical context. This was first done by Lantz and Stefflre (1964), who used a procedure which we may call Approach C. In this method subjects are instructed to communicate with each other about specific referents. There are several variants for a laboratory set-up. The easiest is as follows: two subjusts are each given an identical collection of loose color chips. The subjects may talk to each other but cannot see each other. Subject A choose one color at a time and describes it in such a way that subjust B can identify the color chip. For instance, subjuct A picks one color and describes it as “the color of burned pea soup.”Subject B inspects his sample and makes a guess which color the other subject might have picked; the experimenter records the identification number of both colors and measures the magnitude of the mistake (if any) in terms of the physical distance between the colors.* If this procedure is done on a sufficiently large number of subject-pairs one may statistically reduce individual competence factors and come up with a measure, called communication accuracy, that indicates how well each of the colors in the particular context presented may be identified in the course of naming behavior.
Note that Approach C, leading to the estimation of communication accuracy, no longer indicates exclusively the nature of the relationship between particular words and objects and is thus somewhat marginal to the problem of reference. For instance, a given color chip, say a gray with a blue-green tinge, may obtain a very low communcation accuracy score if it is presented together with fifity other grays, greens.
Blues and intermediate shades, but a very high score if it is presented with fifity shades all of them in the lavender. Pink, red, orange, and yellow range. Although this approach emphasizes the creative element of naming, it probably does not distinguish between the peculiar semantic properties of one natural language over another. The difference between the three approaches is summaruzed in Table 8.1.
(各點代表color)is coverd 一塊另外陰涼地由這個詞。但是,，唯一一些點感覺是"好紅色," 其它點是orangy 紅色或褐色紅色。那意味,，紅色的地圖或區域有一個焦點或中心(是紅色最典型的例子) 的點並且地圖的疆界從未是鋒利的;他們逐漸消失並且至少和一個，通常好幾個其它詞地圖重疊。
很難形象化在詞三維地圖在彩色空間裡面第四維的可能性。但重疊，包含， 和細分命名地圖機率梯度的本質依照被顯示清楚地被看見，如果你採取出於彩色空間線性顏色(例如, 變化只在hueholding 的亮光和飽和) 以便生產顏色空間的一次一維的採取的刺激,，並且然後映射詞彙量對這連續流在Fig.8.4 。方法為獲得這張地圖是那方法B. Notic, 有所有主題根本上叫由同樣名字的某些顏色但是其它顏色由那個名字有時叫由這和有時。顏色第。4 和13 在圖8.4 被給了許多各自的名字, 它不是可能代表他們全部由分明曲線。
因而，當詞被映射入referent 空間，porbabilistic 可變物湧現，我們也許叫名字determinacy 。所在地在referent 空間變化關於名字determinacy 。determinacy 是最偉大的在焦點的中心和離心地減少從這些點; 它是最降低在名字地圖截住。看來是"無名的" 下的地區接近A 是一個了不起和普遍名字indeterminacy 。名字determinacy 是，當然，一種社會現象。
規程被概述這裡是一個方便方式展示一些語義區別在語言之間。例如，顏色命名地圖解決了為Zuni (Lenneberg 並且羅伯特, 1956) 並且部份地為那瓦伙族人(Landar 等, 1960) 並且Conklin (1955) 採取了Hanunoo 顏色類別的研究的Lenneberg 羅伯特技術。這類型經驗主義的reserch 在語義關係以各種各樣的語言可能只被執行在一種語言的總詞彙量之內的一非常小部份,，即只在經驗語言。所以，它不是可能的經驗主義地varify 提出關於語義學"總incomparability" 在無關的語言之中的廣遠的要求。語言調查了全部有名字對於顏色和除發現合併之外二我們的英國顏色地圖入一個，或substructuring 我們的地圖的當中一個, 或轉移在邊界線中□什麼特別吃驚被發現了。我們會集那個人能做在顏色的參考和相當高效率地, 到處, 通信關於顏色。
被瞭解通過方法B 的應用仍然給一張不精確的圖片的怎樣命名現象進行。名字地圖的結構也許導致我們相信, 英國詞紅色可能只被使用為非常少量顏色(區域"紅色的" 焦點); 並且那因為我們從焦點移動詞作為例如淡黃色紅色, 骯髒的紅色、etc.However, 當你提到頭髮的顏色, 或母牛的顏色, 或詞紅色被使用沒有合格者美洲印第安人的膚色總會必須合格。相反地, 被命名brownish-orange 的物理顏色當看起來在顏色, 和紅色Munsell 書當這是母牛的顏色, 也許稱茶黃當看起來在一棟羅馬別墅的牆壁上。名字的選擇相當清楚取決於上下文, 必須被區分在一個特殊情況的數量, 並且有一點做以一種指定的語言語義結構就其本身而言的許多其它因素; 例如, 報告人的意向, 類型人他演講自己對或社會場合的本質也許容易地影響名字的選擇。
唯一固有名稱是相對地免疫的從這些extra-linguistic 決定因素。但雖然命名Albert Einstein 的附件對一個特殊人保留完全地恆定。它暗示那在事例譬如這些語言的characterisyic 方面被消滅, 即創造性的通用性?the dynamics?and 它也許湧出歸結於這減少固有名稱"不感覺" 是一種自然語言的一部分。我們更加看見, threre 通常是沒有直接結合債券在詞和物理對象之間。
它是還可能經驗主義地學習是具體的對指定的物理上下文的命名行為。這是第一由Lantz 和Stefflre (1964) 做, 使用一個做法我們也許稱方法C 。在這個方法服從被指示通信互相關於具體referents 。有幾個變形為實驗室設定。最容易是如下: 二subjusts 每個被給寬鬆顏色芯片的一件相同收藏品。主題也許談話互相但不能互相看。服從A 選擇一種顏色一次和描述它在這種情況下subjust B 可能辨認顏色芯片。例如, subjuct A 和"被燒的豌豆上色另一主題也許已□採摘了的soup."Subject B 的顏色檢查他的樣品和做猜測採摘一種顏色和描述它; 實驗者記錄顏色的標識號和測量差錯的巨大(若有) 根據物理距離在顏色之間。* 如果這個做法完成在主題對你的一個充足地大數字也許統計地減少各自的能力因素和產生措施, 叫做通信準確性, 表明多麼恰當每個顏色在特殊上下文被提出可以被辨認命名行為其間。
注意方法C, 導致通信準確性的估計, 完全不再表明關係的本質在特殊詞和對象之間和是因而有些少量的對參考的問題。例如, 一塊指定的顏色芯片, 認為灰色以青綠色淡色調, 也許獲得一個非常低communcation 準確性比分如果它被提出與fifity 一起其它灰色, 綠色。藍色和中間體樹蔭, 但一個非常高的比分如果它被提出與fifity 遮蔽所有在淡紫色。桃紅色, 紅色, 橙色, 和黃色範圍。雖然這種方法強調命名的創造性的元素, 它大概不區別在一種自然語言之間奇怪語義特徵在另。區別在三種方法之間是summaruzed 在表8.1 。