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Lenneberg (1967) 311
Lenneberg (1967) 310-311~315
負責學生：9580045 張雅雯
內文：
An interesting question concerns the role of intelligence in the acquisition of language. Is mastery of this, in a sense, highly abstract behavior dependent upon measurable intelligence? The problem is complicated (1) by the definition of intelligence and (2) by the changing intelligence quotients with chronological age among the feeble-minded. An individual whose cognitive status remains constant on a level comparable to that of the normal three-year-old appears to have a steadily falling IQ throughout childhood due to the peculiar way in which this figure is computed. The situation is well-illustrated in the scattergram of Fig7-10. (Compare also Zeaman and house, 1962.) The study of the mongoloid population, as well as that of additional case of mental retardation, indicates that there is a certain “IQ threshold value” that varies with age and that must be attained for language to be acquired. Individuals below this threshold have varying degrees of language primitivity, as illustrated in Fig. 4.3(Chapter Four). It is noteworthy that this threshold is relatively low. If we take a population whose IQ is at or just above threshold, which is the case of mongoloids intelligence figures correlate quite poorly with language development. Only if we confine our observations to the low grades of feeblemindedness can a relationship between intelligence and language learning be established.
Among the mongoloids, whose prognosis for mental development is not the worst, chronological age is a much better predictor for language development than computed IQ’s.
The relationship between physical maturation and language development has been treated in Chapter Four. Relevant to the same topic is Table7.4.
( The criteria for “language developing “was the predominance of words and phrases in all utterances and absence or at most a modicum of random babbling.) The relationship between development of gait and of language appears to be roughly similar to that of normal children; there is greater likelihood for language acquisition after gait is established than before. The development of hand preference is particularly interesting. Right-handedness emerges at the time that language unfolds, even though this occurs at a considerably later time than in normal children.
Mongoloid children are known for their simple but affectionate and pleasant personalities. They are eager to please those surrounding them and, of course, are more dependent on parental care than the ordinary child. They have a tendency toward clowning, and they love to imitate. (Such generalizations are possible because they are remarkably alike in their disposition!) Because of their retardation both their state of dependency and their babbling phase are protracted often years beyond the normal duration of these periods. Considering these data, we may well wonder how the development of language differs in these children from that of the rest of the population. If dependence upon adults, extensive babbling, and propensity for imitation were sufficient factors for language development, these children should develop better language than others. Naturally, their mentation must be deemed insufficient for rapid language progress. On the other hand, some do eventually develop all the essentials of language, and, in these cases, we can hardly suppose that they eventually improve their mentation. Once more we are brought to believe that there is an immanent schedule of evolvement in which apparently one set of events sets the stage for a subsequent set, and so on. However, in the case of mongoloids, where worried parents make often desperate efforts to teach their child to speak, where bodily imitation is frequently specifically rewarded by those tending to the child’s needs, we might expect that the children differ among themselves and from other children in “their strategies” for language acquisition. Would it not be possible, theoretically, that one child first tried to perfect his articulation before trying to increase his vocabulary; another might always try to make sentences out of the ten words he knows; or still another might have all his needs taken care of by his family and therefore content himself with learning to understand language without making an effort to speak himself.
Our investigation have shown that this is not so. In all the patients studied, the sequence of learning phases and the synchrony of emergence of different language aspects remained undisturbed by the disease. The correlation matrix of Table 7.5 shows that progress in one field of language learning is well correlated with progress in all other fields, except for articulation.
The variables of the matrix are all dichotomized and qualitative; the data for the correlations are shown in the six contingencies shown in Table 7.6 and 7.7.
The simultaneous unfolding of language,“across the board.” is of great importance for language theories. There is no a priori reason why a child who has stopped babbling and whose utterances are always attempts at saying words or phases, should also have a vocabulary of 50 words or more (he might be content to say the same five words again and again; or he might still be babbling randomly at times while already in possession of some hundred different words); nor is it immediately obvious why the postbabbler should have adequate understanding of spoken commands (he might have learned to imitate like a parrot); or that he should have the same facility in naming people as in naming classes of objects. The one exception to the rule of simultaneous unfolding of language skills is the children’s articulation. The lag is not due to structural abnormalities of fauces or tongue (see complete report, Lenneberg et al..1964)
摘要：
這部份主要是在探討蒙古人其對語言及語言學習的特質性。首先，chronological age是比computed IQ's更來的好的一個對語言發展的預測值。要注意的是：對語言發展的標準判斷是每個言語的優勢辭彙和片語以及缺少或只是少量的隨意亂語。研究發現語言發展和學步有一定程度的相關。
蒙古的小孩最令人關注的是其簡單卻又柔情始終愉悅的心情的特質，和比一般大眾依賴著雙親的照顧。書中懷疑雙親的照顧依賴還有過度的babbling以及模仿的傾向是否是影響語言發展的重要因素。因此，自然地 mentation會被認為並不足夠造成快速的語言發展的進行。我們相信每個人皆有一個天生故有的演化機制，策略決定行進的步驟。Table7.5指出不同的語言學習區域是彼此相關的。比如Extent of naming和 understanding 或是和vocabulary都有相關性。
對語言同時發展的理論而言across the board是個很重要的理論。在先前沒有理由可以解釋babbling的停止以及我們總是傾向說出字詞和片語的現象，還有怎麼能擁有50或更多字彙的能力等等種種現象……
工具書：朗文當代高級字典(英英 英漢雙解)
Lenneberg (1967) 315下~318-319
負責學生：9580032
內文：
It is exactly the opposite of what we might expect from at least one theoretical point of view. If the development of speech were the consequence of the child’s hearing, his own utterances, and noticing the similarities between his own and his parent’s sounds, and if the pleasure in speaking derived from his ability to reproduce, for example, his mother’s sounds, then his first “aim” should be to replicate as a accurately as possible the mature sounds he hears. The mental defect should be no obstacle here, or perhaps even an advantage much the way talking birds say sentences without the benefit of a human mentality.
The poor articulation of the mongoloid child may actually be related to a lack of motivation. Usually these children can articulate better than they do, but apparently exact acoustic rendering of utterance is not important to them. The children in our mongoloid sample words in which the most common phonemes of English were embedded in vocalic or consonantal surroundings for consonants and vowels respectively. The child was asked to repeat one word at a time. The performance of a selected sample of children (N = 25) on this articulation test was compared with their articulation of spontaneously produced words and phrases. The analysis was performed by two linguistics.* In all cases studied, performance on the test was considerably better than during spontaneous speech, thus demonstrating that the child is organically capable of accurate articulation.
An expedient way for testing understanding is to have subjects repeat sentences. Most of us have attempted at one time or another to repeat something in a totally foreign language. In the absence of understanding, even the reproduction of a single word may be difficult, whereas short sentences are an impossibility.
Consider the following transcribed attempts at sentence reception. This is a twelve-year-old mongoloid girl whose language development is comparable to that of a normal two-and-a-half year old.
*Jacqueline Wei Mintz and Peter Rosenbaum. Throughout the observation period the child wore a condenser microphone in a bib around his chest. Recording equipment was of high fidelity. The examination room was sound proofed.
The first nine sentences seem to have been essentially understood, but in all sentences except three the repeated sentence is slightly different from the model sentence. The alterations in several instances are not grammatical English, so that the child could not have heard them before. This patient is still deficient in some of the more refined rules of English, but the basic sentence type is present. The “do-constructions” are understood but the rules do not function well enough yet to enable this patient to apply them to sentence. Consequently, sentences (6), (8), and (9) are changed back into grammatically simpler but incorrect forms. Sentence (7) is the only attempt, only partially successful, to use the “dose-not-form.” The passive construction in sentences (10) to (14) is not well understood, although question (13) is answered correctly. However, all attempts at reception of the sentences are failures.
In sentences (10) and (12) reception is attempted by apparently taking recourse to a different strategy. Instead of trying to understand the meaning of the sentence and to reproduce the sentence the sentence is ignored entirely and repetition is attempted as in a rote memory task. When we are asked to repeat a string of random digits, we are only able to repeat the last ones, and the number of digits remembered is a function of memory span. When grammatical connections between words is not understood, the subject behaves as if a string of randomly concatenated words had been presented. This blind repetition may be called parroting.
In our study of language-understanding among the mongoloid, we were interested to know at what stage of development a child would take recourse to parroting. A child was said to be simply parroting if he only repeated of picking out some functionally important words such as the subject-noun and the verb. We classified the responses of a selected group of children (N = 25) into: (1) correct repetitions of the original sentence; (2) sentences that are grammatically correct but different from the original; (3) recognizable sentences that are grammatically incorrect; (4) two-word phrases that are not parroting; and (5) parroting. This subsample of our patients was divided into five groups according to their grammatical ability. Figure 7.11 shows the result. Parroting dose not seem to be the way to begin language. This was also clearly brought out in a recent study by Ervin (1964). Parroting is resorted to when the grammar of the original sentence is simply not understood. It is comparable to a panic-response elicited by the pressure of the examiner to get the subject to “try his best.”
FIG.7.11 Distribution of “parroting responses” with respect to stages of development in 25 mongoloid children.
TABLE 7.8 Transformational Relations between Conjunctions and their Underlying Sentences
*It has recently shown that this type of sentence may be accounted for in simpler ways which further strengthens the point of structural differences between the two examples.
摘要：
這篇文章主要是在探討語言覆誦在語言發展裡的重要性，如果孩子的語言發展是她的聽力、語調與對父母語言的注意，那麼他複製語言的能力在語言的發展上是很重要的。
Mongoloid的孩子較弱的發音關係到刺激的缺乏，他們可以發音發的更好，但顯然地，精準的聲學發音對他們而言不是那麼的重要。在測驗中對孩子的選擇性樣本測試發現，測驗的表現和他們自發性的字句是可以比較的，而此為將兩種語言進行分析。在其他個案的研究中，測驗的表現比自發性說話來的好，因此這證明了孩子有準確發音的組織能力。
我們大多企圖用外與覆誦，但在缺乏相關知識下，即使複製一個單字也是很困難的，更不用說是一句話了。在企圖覆誦句子的部份，一個12歲的mongoloid女孩的語言發展相當於一個正常的2歲半孩子。從語言發展的原始階段研究中，從一些句子得知，mongoloid的孩子已有基本的認知了，只是在一些例子的改變中，發現他們的句子較不符合英文文法，所以表示個案仍缺乏更精確的英文文法規則，但基本的形式已表現出來了，然而，試圖複製句子的部分仍是失敗的。當他們試圖利用不同的策略時，他們並非試著了解句子的意義且重複句子的要點，完全忽略和試圖反覆的記憶句子。若不能理解文法的連結，而只是盲目的重複,，這樣的行為稱作”鸚鵡式仿說”。
在研究mongoloid的語言認知中，我們又將其仿說的方式分成：(1)正確的重複原始句子(2)句子文法正確，但與原始句子不同(3)句子的文法錯誤(4)在雙詞片語部分沒有仿說(5)鸚鵡式仿說。
機械性的重複語言並非學習語言的方法，這只是用在當一個原始句子的文法並不全然理解的情況，可以相較於誘導測試者做到他的最好的理由。
工具書：無敵CD-88電子辭典、http://dict.vghtpe.gov.tw/search.php
Lenneberg (1967) 319~321
負責學生：9580014 吳馥榕
內文：
The reality of grammatical structure is well-illustrated by the following two sentences taken from the sentence test:
(1) Peter likes small cookies and red lollipops.
(2) Peter wants one, and so does Johnny.
These sentences have seven words each and all the words have a common occurrence in the discourse of children. Yet sentence (1) was found to be mush easier for our subject than sentence (2). Even though mistakes are often made in the repetition of sentence (1), the nature of the mistakes clearly shows that the child has understood the original sentence in its basic structure and semantic content. Following are two typical attempts at repeating this sentence:
“Peter like red cookies and red lollipops.”
“Peter like cookies and he like lollipops.”
When sentence (2) as attempted, three times as many parroting responses (for example, “Johnny”, “So does Johnny”) occurred than for sentence (1), and the mistakes showed a lack of insight into the grammatical structure and meaning of the sentence; examples are:
“Peter want—uh—Johnny.”
“Peter does no want one too and so but Jimmy.”
The best explanation for the difference in ease of repeating these two sentences may be found in an analysis of their grammatical structure.
Table 7.8 is a rough sketch (with a number of simplifications) of the grammatical structure of these sentences. It is obvious that they differ enormously in their degrees of complexity and this is clearly the cause of the children’s difficulty with the second one. Familiarity of frequency of occurrence can hardly be used as explanatory factors because the children can repeat sentences they have never heard before, and which are therefore totally unfamiliar, as long as the underlying structure is clear to them. This grammatical explanation appears to be further corroborated by the types of mistakes made on sentence (2) by those children who are in possession of the basic elements of grammar (but with some “higher-order rules” still missing. For instance, one child, after a moment’s reflection, repeated sentence (2) as “Johnny wants one and Peter wants one” which conforms verbatim to our analysis here.
When very young children (24 to about 30 months) are compared with the mongoloids in terms of their respective performance on the sentence repetition test, we are impressed with the similarity. Unfortunately, there is no reliable method available at present to quantify this impression, but the inaccuracies, mistakes, and occasional forays into parroting-strategies appear to be strikingly alike. Thus, the intellectual limitation does not produce bizarre language behavior; it merely results in arrest at primitive, but “normal,” stages of development.
(3) Language Acquisition in the Congenitally Deaf*
The last type ph handicap to be considered in this chapter is congenital, profound deafness. The following observations apply only to peripheral nerve deafness in children who are otherwise well, particularly from a neuropsychiatric viewpoint.
Language development in these children is of great interest for a language theory, because it can be shown that despite this devastating handicap, it is entirely possible to develop good language skills (though, unfortunately, only a few achieve complete perfection). In order to appreciate fully the magnitude of this achievement, we must realize to what extent the deaf child is quantitatively and qualitatively deprives of language input.
In America it is not until the child is four or five that intensive language training is begun, and during the first year the training is merely preparatory, that is, readiness for the instruction in articulation, lip reading, and reading and writing. When instruction proper beings there is, in many schools, a decided unwillingness to put too much reliance on the graphic medium. Although words and sentences are written in the blackboard and the child himself also learns to write, the emphasis is usually on the production of sounds and lip reading. If communication between pupil and teacher fails, the child is often not allowed either to gesture or to make use of his newly acquired writing skills, and the teachers also hesitate to facilitate their communications by writing (expect for specific classroom instruction) in order to foster what is know as an “oralist attitude” among their charges. Many schools also instruct the parents not to take recourse to writing for communication in the home, for the same reason, and we have had many a teacher of the deaf tell us that it is not desirable for deaf children to make reading for fun a hobby while they are still in school.
*Following comments are based on several years of observation in schools for the deaf throughout the country. I would like to thank the principals and teachers for their cooperation, assistance, and hospitality, and to express my admiration for their devoted and patient efforts to help these children, so underprivileged by nature. If the following remarks are critical (as they are meant to be), they are not intended to belittle the thought, experience, and good will that is the background of present-day education of the deaf. My remarks, despite their sketchiness, are offered here as a possible contribution—not a deprecation.
摘要：
第一段：
句子1是小孩在複說句子時常見的錯誤，顯示其了解原始句子的基本架構及語意；而句子2的複說會出現鸚鵡式仿說，表示其不了解語意及結構。這兩個句子最大的差別在於複雜度，而句子2的結構平常很少出現於日常生活中以至於小孩不熟悉其架構而造成複說上的困難。
雖然沒有可量化的證據顯示24-30個月的小孩和Mongoloids在複說的表現上差異不大，不過他們的錯誤是相當類似的。因此，智力只會限制早期的正常語言發展，而不會造成異常的語言行為。
第二段：(3) Language Acquisition in the Congenitally Deaf*
在美國，小孩到4、5歲才開始被教導如何發音、讀唇、閱讀及書寫，而大多的教育體系並不支持給予太多的圖畫輸入，並強調在構音及讀唇上。老師與學生的溝通不良會使小孩不被允許使用手語或使用其習得的新書寫技能，而老師也會猶豫是否要加強其書寫技能而專注於口語發展上。許多學校亦告知父母在生活中不要給小孩書寫的溝通工具，而且將閱讀當作一興趣或只是為了好玩，對聽障兒童是無益的。
工具書：BESTA CD-八59
Lenneberg (1967) P321~322上、331
負責學生：9580025 林宜蒨
內文：
p321~322上
Thus there can be no doubt that the deaf come in contact with language at an age when other children have fully mastered this skill and when, perhaps, the most important formative period for language establishment is already on the decline; furthermore, their contact with language samples, even at this late age, is dramatically reduced in amount in comparison with the amount of language to which a hearing child is exposed; and finally, these children have to process visually what other children receive aurally. The latter point is of no small consequence because there are indications that the eye is slower in its temporal integration than the ear, and, therefore, even if perfection could be attained in lip reading (the most proficient lip readers cannot identify more 40 to 50﹪ of articulated phonemes （Eggermont, 1964）, ordinary discourse would be so fast that only small parts could be followed adequately.
Language proficiency varies a great deal among pupils in the schools. This is primarily due to such factors as the profoundness of the handicap, its cause, the age at which hearing was lost, and the adaptability of the child to the school environment. Below is a sample of quite average language proficiency of a congenitally deaf boy, aged sixteen （eleven years of schooling）.
A Boy Liked a Cigar
A boy was named Robert Kennedy. His age was twelve years old.
When his father went shopping, he had a nothing to do except to eat something. He remembered his father told him promised to his father not to eat somethings. Later he had a big idea. He went to library room. He walked over his father’s new sofa. The sofa was dirty. He opened the box of cigar. He picked one. And he think and remember his father told him to do. He putted back it. He leave library room. And one of tiny devil told him disobey his father. He lighted it. He smoked for one hour. Later his father came to home. He slept and felt very sick. His father called him. But he did not called. His father thought he ran away. He ran and looked many rooms. The last room he found. He brother him. His father told him what happen to you. He said, ”Nothing!” His father smelled smoke. His father asked him. “Did you smoked my cigar？”He said, “Yes.” His father scold him. And a tiny angle was fight with a tiny devil.
It is clear that this boy has achieved an amazing amount of competence in English, considering the obstacles. Nevertheless, there are many mistakes of grammar and style. In the course of my work with the deaf, I have received a sizeable collection of letters from young deaf parents and also older individuals. Among all of these correct spondents, there are some individuals who have been profoundly deaf all their lives but whose letters are perfect in grammar. The vast majority, however, make grammatical mistakes of varying degree of severity and about half have the proficiency exemplified in the previous sample.
I am inclined to believe that the failures in proficiency are primarily due to shortcomings in instruction and training, and not due to inherent learning incapacities of the deaf. My clinical experience with congenital anarthria suggests that language competence in the deaf could be vastly improved if they were given much more graphically presented language material and at a much earlier age. It is my impression that their language difficulties (in writing) are due to an acute input deficiency－they have just not been given enough examples(raw data to foster their own language synthesis) during the critical early years. This impression is corroborated by those deaf adults who write good grammar, because they are invariably the most avid readers, and have been so for many years. Although peripheral deafness is injurious to oral speech performance, there is no reason why the basic capacity to acquire knowledge of language ought to be implicated as well. The argument that early acquaintance with and recourse to reading and writing is detrimental to these children’s skills in oral communication and lip reading lacks evidence. In fact, we might assume that if these children had better knowledge of language, both of these other skills might be facilitated considerably.
p331
Ⅱ TOWARD A BIOLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF SEMANTICS
The activity of naming or, in general, of using words may be seen as the human peculiarity to make explicit a process that is quite universal among higher animals, namely, the organization of sensory data. All vertebrates are equipped to superimpose categories of functional equivalence upon stimulus configurations, to classify objects in such a way that a single type of response is given to any one member of a particular stimulus category. The criteria or nature of categorization have to be determined empirically for each species. Frogs may jump to a great variety of flies and also to a specific range of dummy-stimuli, provided the stimuli preserve specifiable characteristics of the “real thing.”
Furthermore, most higher animals have a certain capacity for discrimination. They may learn or spontaneously begin to differentiate certain aspects within the first global category, perhaps by having their attention directed to certain details or by sharpening their power of observation. In this differentiation process initial categories may become subdivided and become mutually exclusive, or a number of coexisting general and specific categories or partially overlapping categories may result. Again, the extent of a species’ differentiation capacity is biologically given and must be ascertained empirically for each species. Rats cannot make the same range of distinctions that dogs can make, and the latter are different in this respect from monkeys. The interspecific differences cannot merely be explained by differences in peripheral sensory thresholds. Apparently, a function of higher, central processes is involved that to do with cognitive organization.
Most primates and probably many species in other mammalian orders have the capacity to relate various categories to one another and thus to respond to relations between things rather than to things themselves; an example is “to respond to the largest of any collection of things.” Once more, it is a matter of empirical research to discover the limits of relations that a species is capable of responding to.
In summary, most animals organize the sensory world by a process of categorization, and from this basic mode of organization two further processes derive: differentiation or discrimination, and interrelating of categories or the perception of and tolerance for transformations（Chapter Seven）. In man these organizational activities are usually called …
摘要
當其他孩子已經完全掌握這項技能時，耳聾的小孩在建立語言聯繫方面，在最重要形成時期是仍然是在下降的，且跟一般人比較，耳聾的人要利用視覺來替代一般人的聽覺。眼睛可以暫時綜合聽覺的跡象，例如讀唇語(雖然精準度不太會超過40~50%)，但清楚的音素嘴型，平常的速度，可以使他們讀出來。
語言水平的差異，在國小時最明顯。因為那是他們適應環境開始，而且聽力損失的程度也大概穩定了。下面是一個耳聾的16歲青年寫的故事。(有11年的學校生活)
故事
有一個12歲的男孩，名叫羅伯特‧甘迺迪。當他爸爸去買東西時，男孩什麼事都不能做，除了吃東西。但他記得爸爸要他不要吃ㄧ種東西。後來他去書房，經過爸爸的心沙發，沙發很髒。他打開ㄧ個裝有雪茄的盒子，當他拿起一根時，他想起爸爸說的話，所以又放下，直接去書房。但心中的惡魔說不要服從爸爸的話，所以他就點了一根雪茄抽了。爸爸回來後叫他，他沒回應，爸爸以為他跑走了。最後爸爸找到他，聞到菸味，問他：「你是不是有抽雪茄？」他回答：「有」然後心裡的天使和惡魔在打架。
很清楚的這個男孩已經有很大量的英語程度，但是還是有錯誤。大部分的聾人，都會有文法上的錯誤，但是有些人在文法上的應用，正確率也很高。
聾人不會因為本身殘缺而無能力，而是在學習上的失敗或缺點。有先天的anarthria的病患，在早期給於治療，加用圖表，可以使他們語言大大有進步。由此可知，什麼年齡時介入，也有影響。聾人有好文法，應該是積極的閱讀者。其實安靜的環境，並不會使聾人無法學習語言。還是有辦法讓他們學習，像是讓他們透過閱讀、手寫、讀唇語等技巧。
對於生物語義學的概念
命名的活動，是人類常有的特性，也被認為是高等動物的一種分化。然而在命名時，要以每一種自然的歸類和生活經驗為主，青蛙和蒼蠅就有不同的特性。而且，大多數高等的動物有某種區別的能力。他們可以透過敏銳的觀察，或者是某ㄧ些細節，而發現差異。這些都是由生活的經驗所來累積的。所以每一種生物也會有不同的特性。
工具書：電子辭典 無敵CD-326
Lenneberg (1967) 322~324上
負責學生：9580039 陳穎萱
內文：
Present-day language instruction of deaf children is of theoretical interest for yet another reason. In contrast to the hearing child, who is simply surrounded by a sea of sentences, well-formed and poorly formed and who builds up his sentence-making skill without knowing how, the deaf child is usually immediately introduced to theoretical grammar. In the course of his first year of language instruction, he is told that he must speak in sentences and that a proper sentence is made up of nouns and verbs, that nouns must have article, and so on. These theoretical terms are written on the blackboard and also appear in some of the books that are used in the lower grades. Thus we have a situation in which the children are on the one hand quantitatively deprived of a large body of examples. And on the other hand are immediately given a meta-language, a language about the language which they do not yet have. Their own spontaneity of putting out the type of primitive sentences which, as we have seen, are apparently the necessary developmental stage that must precede the complete unfolding of grammar in hearing children, is restricted by teachers who do not tolerate answers in “incomplete sentence.” The child’s flow of communication is constantly stopped by the teacher’s instructions “to complete the sentence,” which is accompanied by a theoretical discussion of how to do this (“verb is missing,” “the article is not correct,” etc.).
This mode of instruction raises an important question. Is it possible to instruct somebody how language works by giving him rules－particularly when he has little language as yet? The invariable emergence of written intelligible language (oral speech of at least half of the profoundly and congenitally deaf remains difficult to understand throughout their lives) is a testimony to man’s enormous capacity to develop language competence even under conditions of severe deprivation.
Following are a few illustrations of language development under these circumstances: (each composition is the complete, written description of picture).
Language sample of a child after one year of instruction:
A boy is stoling candy. He is on the chair. He is a light. He is a short. He ate candy. His mother naught. He is crying.
Sample of a child’s language after two years of instruction:
The boy went to the school. We buy a Card Valentine her mother. The dog a dirty feet the rain because he was shoe dirty because she was saw the boy came home.
Sample of a child’s language after three years of instruction:
Edd and Browine got mud on his house. He make a flower for his mother. He forget to closte the door. Outside is rain. He was dope because he was little boy know noting about it. His mother will angry with him because he was careless boy. His mother didn’t want to clean the house because she will tried of it. He will help dog get a bath because he take dog for awalk.
Sample of child’s language after five years of instruction:
One day he lived in
From these examples it is clear that the construction of proper sentence is not facilitated by telling a child how to do it. It must be admitted that no one knows how it is done. The new approach to grammatical theory, generative grammar, is no more useful in this respect than the grammars that were handed down to us from antiquity. In fact, the new grammars are, substantively, not so different from the old ones, except for greater accuracies, special attention to peculiarities in given grammars of natural languages, more rigorous formulations, and, in certain other ways, they constitute a more objective approach, as many be gathered from the Appendix and its bibliography. No grammar, old or new, furnishes us with a recipe how to speak grammatically. There is no grammatical system available that could be used to help an essentially language－deficient person to put words together to from good sentences. So far, grammars merely specify the underlying structure of sentences and explain how sentences of different structure are related to each other.
摘要：
聽力正常的小孩，很容易的就暴露在眾多的句子當中，而聾小孩則經常立即的就被指引到學習理論的文法。在這課程中，他被要求必須使用完全正確的句子，然後分別在學習後的第一、二、三、四、五年時測驗他的句子結構。在這幾個例子中發現，句子結構的缺乏是不容易經由告知而讓他知道如何去改進的，而且沒有人知道句子是如何被建構。無論是新語法或舊的語法，都無法告知句子是如何被建構的，也沒有一個語法的系統能有效告訴語言缺陷的人到底如何把一堆字放在一起，而形成一個好的句子；到目前為止，語法僅說明了基本的句子結構和解釋不同結構的句子如何被連結在一起而已。
工具書：朗文當代高級辭典（英英 英漢雙解）
Lenneberg (1967) 324~326上
負責學生：9580030 白欣玉
內文：
It is true that the sentences of the deaf gradually improve as they advance in school.
It is also true that this is due to instruction, but it is probably not so much due to grammatical instruction as to the child’s increasing contact with language examples from which he begins to abstract structural commonalities that help him to synthesize his own sentences. He knows as little about how he does this as we who are capable of speaking or writing in grammatically correct ( or at least understandable) sentences.
Because of examples such as those quoted here we are led to the conclusion that language instruction of the deaf would profit from (1) greater access to written material at an earlier age, (2) greater freedom in written expression, (3) greater acceptance ( on the part of teachers and parents) of primitive language productions and grammatical deviations, and (4) a ban of grammatical meta-language until a basic proficiency in language is fully established.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The study of grammar in the adult and in the child leads to the following hypothesis. In the mechanisms of language we find a natural extension of very general principles of organization of behavior which are biologically adapted to a highly specific ethological function. With maturation, the neonate begins to organize the perceptually available stimuli surrounding him and also to organize the movements of his muscles. Sensory data become grouped into as yet undifferentiated, global classes of gross patterns, and these, subsequently, become differentiated into more specific patterns. Similarly, movements which at first involve the entire body become differentiated into finer motor patterns. Both the perceived patterns and the self-produced patterns of movement become organized or grouped in functional categories, and hierarchies of categories. Members of a particular category are functionally equivalent because they either elicit an identical response or they serve one and the same function within the over-all structure of a particular behavior pattern. It is these general principles of differentiation and categorization that appear in specialized form in verbal behavior. They influence the organization of perceived material as well as the motor output.
Thus the characteristics of phrase-structure (as described by phrase-markers) appear as the natural outcome of an application of the differentiation principle to the acoustic patterns, called language. Also, the transformational principle in language appears to be virtually identical with the cognitive principles that underly the ability to categorize both the patterns of the environment and the patterns produced by our own movements. Whenever grouping occurs in terms of a common denominator( in other words, categorization that is in some empirically determinable way natural to the categorizer, be it animal or man), an essentially “transformational” process is involved. This is most clearly seen where the constituents of a single category lack any common physical dimension and where the commonality is thus an abstracted pattern or structure. In these cases, the physically given, sensory “reality” is transformed into abstracted structure, and similarity between the two physically different patterns is established through the possibility of transforming the abstracted structures back to either of the physically given patterns. All perceptions of similarities and relations depend upon the organism’s capacities for transformations; but this capacity is limited biologically. There are only certain ranges of transformations that a given species can handle. The range is always quite narrow and may be discovered by empirical investigations (just as sensory thresholds may be determined); but within the established limits there is still an infinity of possible transformations. Some such transformations may be possible but difficult for a given species to handle, and the animal may require much experience before it can make the transformation.
The transformations of grammar are biologically specialized transformations, applicable to acoustic patterns that have in man the function of communication. This type of transformational capacity is clearly biologically given, but the specific transformations as they occur in one or another language are just some of the infinitely possible ones.
A superficial survey of language development in defective children revealed the following points: an individual’s knowledge of language, as determinable by testing his comprehension, may be established in the complete absence of capacities for language- or speech-specific responses, that is, the ability of the learner himself to speak. This emphasizes the importance of Chomsky’s competence-performance distinction and makes those language theories doubtful that are primarily based upon a response-shaping hypothesis.
摘要
聾小孩會提取結構上的共性來合成他自己的句子。而聾小孩可以用下列幾個方法來學習語言： 1)童年的時候就有良好的管道學習寫作 2)寫作表達的自由度高 3)語言產生早期有高接受度 4)語言基本熟練的建立。
新生兒吸收環境中的刺激去組織知覺系統和肌肉動作。感覺系統用特別的模式分類。而在有瑕疵的孩子語言發展的表面檢視顯露了以下幾點：語言個體的知識由他自己的閱讀能力決定，也可能建立在語言的完全缺乏容量或講話的具體反應。也就是，學習者的講話能力。這強調Chomsky分別的表現能力的重要性並且使主要根據一個反應塑造的假說的那些語言理論半信半疑。
工具書：http://www.hk-doctor.com/html/dict.php
這是醫學專用的辭典，所以看的這篇文章很多還是找不到，但是若是查的到的他提供的資料卻很豐富。所以查一些普通的單字我只用電子辭典無敵CD-56。
Lenneberg (1967) 326下、329~330
負責學生：9580033 丁筱柔
內文：
p326下
A comparison of language in retarded children with language development of normal children indicates that there is a “natural language-learning strategy” that cannot be altered by training programs. Language unfolds lawfully and in regular stages. Language progress in the retarded appears to be primarily controlled by their biological maturation and their development of organizational principles rather than intelligent insight. The pathologically lowered IQ of the retarded does not result in bizarre use of language but merely in “frozen” but normal primitive language stages.
A remarkable degree of language competence is achieved by the congenitally deaf, despite apparently overwhelming handicaps. Thus, language may still develop under very abnormal conditions. The specific teaching of grammatical rules (no matter whether they are old-fashioned ones or modern) does not appear to help the children substantially in their language development. There is no reason to doubt that their language proficiency would develop in the same manner as it develops in the hearing who are simply given a great number of grammatical (and often semigrammatical) sentences from which they abstract the structural principles by which they themselves begin then to form new sentences. Deaf children could hardly differ in the capacity for doing this from hearing children, provided they were given enough examples and are allowed to go through a natural order of grammatical development. We do not know how hearing children develop their ability to abstract structural principles, and we do not know how deaf children might do it. But this is no reason to try to instill language habits by means (teaching of grammatical rules) which have never been shown to be of any use for any other language-learning child.
chapter7 Reference 327-328
Bellugi, Ursula(1966),Development of Negative and Interrogative Structures in the Speech of Children, in T. Bever and W. Weksel(eds.). Studies in Psycholinguistics. Holt, Rineheart and
Berko, J. (1958), The child’s learning of English morphology. Word14:150-177.
Bosma, J. and Lind, J. (1962), Upper respiratory mechanisms of newborn infants, Acta Paediat. Suppl. 135:32-44.
Braine, M. D. S. (1963), The ontogeny of English phrase structure: the first phase, Languase 39:1-13.
Brown, R. and Bellugi, U.(1964), Three processes in the child’s acquisition of syntax, in
Brown, R. and Fraser, C. (1963), The acquisition of syntax. In Verbal Behavior
And Learning, C. N. Cofer and B. S. Musgrave (eds.). McGraw-Hill. New
Carmichael, L. (1954), Handbook of Child Psychology (2nd ed.). John Wiley and
Sons,
Chomsky, N. (1957), Syntactic Structures, Mouton and Co. .
Chomsky, N. (1965), Aspects of the theory of syntax. M.I.T. Press,
Chomsky, N. and G. A. （1963）, Introduction to the formal analysis of natural language, in R. D. Luce, R. Bush, and E. Galanter(eds.). Handbook of Mathematical Psychology, Vol. II. John Wiley and Sons.
Eggermont, J. P. M. (1964), Taalverwerving bij een groep dore kinderen. Wolters,
Ervin, Susan M. (1964), Imitation and structural change in children’s language, in E. Lenneberg (ed.), New Directions in the Study of Language. M.I.T. Press,
Fisichelli, V. R., Karelitz, S., Eichbauer, J., and Rosenfeld, L. S. (1961). Volumeunit graphs: their production and applicability in studies of infants’ cries, J. Psychol. 52:423-427.
Fraser, C., Bellugi, Ursula, and Brown. R. (1963), Control of grammar in imitation, comprehension. J. verb. Learn. Verb. Behav.2:121-135.
Jakobson, R.(1942), Kindersprache, Aphasie und allgemeine Lautgesetze, Uppsala Universitets Aarsskrift.
Jakobson, R., Fant, C. G.., and
the distinctive features and their correlates(2nd ed.).M.I.T. Press,
Jenkins,J.J., and
Monograph of the Society for Research in Child Development, Serial No.92, Vol. 29, No. 1
Katz, J.J. and Postal, P. M. (1964), An integrated theory of linguistic descriptions. Research Monograph No. 26. M. I. T. Press,
Klima, E. S. (1964), Negation in English, in J. A. Fodor and J. J. Katz (eds.),The Structure of Language: Readings in the Philosophy of Language. Prentice-Hall,
Lenneberg, E. H., Rebelsky, F. G., and Nichols, I. A. (1965), The vocalizations of infants born to deaf and to hearing parents, Vita Humana (Human Development) 8:23-37.
Leopold, W. F. (1953-1954), Patterning in children’s language learning, Language Learning 5:1-14.
Mehler, J. and Miller, G.. A. (1964), Retroactive interference in the recall of simple sentences, Brit. J. Psychol. 55:295-301.
Miller, G.. A. and Chomsky, N. (1963). Finitary models of language users, in R. D. Luce, R. Bush, and E. Galanter (eds), Handbook of Mathematical Pstchology, Vol. Π. John Wiley and Sons,
Miller, G.. A., Galanter, E., and Pribram, K. H. (1960), Plans and the Structure of Behavior. Holt, Rinehart and
Lane, H. and Sheppard, W. C. (1965, in press), presentation at Conference on Language Development in
Lenneberg, E. H. (1962), A laboratory for speech research at the Children’s
Lenneberg, E. H. (1962), Understanding language without ability to speak, J. abnorm. soc. Psychol. 65:419-425.
Lenneberg, E. H. (1964), Language disorders in childhood, Harvard Educational Review 34:No. 2, 152-177.
Lenneberg, E. H., Nichols, I. A., and Rosenberger, E. F. (1964), Primitive stages of language development in mongolism, in Disorder of Communication, Vol. XLII: Research Publications, A.R.N.M.D., pp.119-137.
Osgood, C. E.(1957).Motivational dynamics of language behavior, in Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, M. R. Jones(ed.).Univ. of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, Nebraska.
Premack, D. and Schwartz, A. (1966), Preparations for discussing behaviorism
with chimpanzee, in The Genesis of Language: in Children and Animals.
M. I. T. Press,
Ringel, R. L. and Kluppel, D .D. (1964), Neonatal crying: a normative study,
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Spitz, R.A. and Wolf, K. M. (1946), The smiling response; a contribution to the ontogenesis of social relations, Genet. Psychol.Monogr.34：57-125
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Child Development 33：481-488
p329-331
CHAPTER Eight
Language and cognition
I. THE PROBLEM
The general problem to be considered in this chapter may be called the problem of reference; that is, the relationship between words and things, and the role that our capacity for naming may play in man’s organization of cognition.
That the capacity for naming has a biological dimension may be seen from the difficulties that animals experience in this respect. For instance, it is possible to train a hunting dog to “point,” and it may be quite possible to teach him to point to a specific set of objects in a specific environment upon appropriate command in a natural language. But it does not appear to be possible to teach a dog to do the “name-specific stimulus generalization” that every child does automatically. The hound who has learned to “point to the tree, the gate, the house” in the trainer’s yard will perform quite erratically when given the same command with respect to similar but physically different object in an unfamiliar environment. The correctness of the animal’s responses may even vary with such extralinguistic cues as the geographical position, posture, and bodily movements of his master, the time of day, or the clothes that people are wearing while he is being exercised. There is no convincing evidence that any animal below man has ever learned to that word in common language-usage. So-called proof to the contrary always lacks proper controls on interpretation. For instance, there is a report on a parrot who could say good-by (in German) and who supposedly knew what this word meant or when it is properly used. Once the bird was also heard to say good-by upon the arrival of some friends of the family; the proud owner judged this to be a sign that his pet did not merely know the meaning of the word but was even using it to produce a desired effect: to send the just-arrived friends away, presumably because he had taken a dislike to them.
It may be well to stress once more that our concern is with the capacity for (natural, human) language which, ordinarily, leads to the understanding of a definably structured type of utterance; or, in other words, with knowing a language. The infant who has a repertoire of three tricks (wave by-by, show me your tongue, show me how tall you are) which he can perform upon the appropriate commands but who can understand no other sentence of the same grammatical, structural type has not yet begun to acquire language. The essence of language is its productivity; in the realm of perception and understanding of sentences, it is the capacity to recognize structural similarities between familiar and entirely novel word patterns. Thus our criterion for knowing language is not dependent upon demonstrations that an individual can talk or that he goes through some stereotyped performance upon hearing certain words, but upon evidence that he can analyze novel utterances through the application of structural principles. It is the purpose of this chapter to show that the understanding of the word-object relationship, the learning and acquisition of reference, is also dependent upon certain cognitive, analytic skills, much the way understanding sentence is. The problem of reference cannot be discussed without simultaneous considerations of the relationship between language and cognition.
Evidence for understanding language may be supplied by different kinds of response. It is not necessary that the subject has the anatomical and physiological prerequisites for actual speech production. In the case of man, we may cite children who have learned to understand language but who cannot speak; compare this to children who have the anatomical equipment for speech production but whose cognitive apparatus is so poorly developed that only the primordial for language are detectable but not fullfledged comprehension. In the case of animals, we have birds who can talk but who give no evidence of language understanding and we have famous case of Clever Hans, the horse, who had a nonacoustic response repertoire (stamping of hoofs) that, unfortunately, gave the erroneous impression of a coding system for the German language. Had the horse actually had the cognitive capacity for acquiring a natural language, his motor response limitations would have been no obstacle to his giving evidence for language comprehension. A similar argument could be made for the physical nature of the input data. Language acquisition is not dependent in man upon processing of acoustic patterns. There are many instances today of Deaf-and blind people who have built up language capacities on tactually perceived stimulus configuration.
摘要：
小孩在學習語言的過程是依循一個自然的發展階段，很難由刻意安排的訓練課程來學會。在教導孩子語言時，可試著採漸進式地灌輸一些文法規則給他們，讓他們逐漸熟悉文法而主動產生新的語句。
要命名一個物體必須先了解名字與物體之間的關係。動物在學習事物時可能會因為當時的地理位置、主人的動作、手勢等等因素的不同而對相同的命令有不同的反應；也有可能在不曾熟悉的情形下做出相同的反應，就像嬰兒學習語言時並非制式化，他們可以從新的語句中和原有的認知重組以便了解其中的含意。
工具書：快譯通MD58牛津當代大辭典
Lenneberg (1967) p331
Ⅱ TOWARD A BIOLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF SEMANTICS
The activity of naming or, in general, of using words may be seen as the human peculiarity to make explicit a process that is quite universal among higher animals, namely, the organization of sensory data. All vertebrates are equipped to superimpose categories of functional equivalence upon stimulus configurations, to classify objects in such a way that a single type of response is given to any one member of a particular stimulus category. The criteria or nature of categorization have to be determined empirically for each species. Frogs may jump to a great variety of flies and also to a specific range of dummy-stimuli, provided the stimuli preserve specifiable characteristics of the “real thing.”
Furthermore, most higher animals have a certain capacity for discrimination. They may learn or spontaneously begin to differentiate certain aspects within the first global category, perhaps by having their attention directed to certain details or by sharpening their power of observation. In this differentiation process initial categories may become subdivided and become mutually exclusive, or a number of coexisting general and specific categories or partially overlapping categories may result. Again, the extent of a species’ differentiation capacity is biologically given and must be ascertained empirically for each species. Rats cannot make the same range of distinctions that dogs can make, and the latter are different in this respect from monkeys. The interspecific differences cannot merely be explained by differences in peripheral sensory thresholds. Apparently, a function of higher, central processes is involved that to do with cognitive organization.
Most primates and probably many species in other mammalian orders have the capacity to relate various categories to one another and thus to respond to relations between things rather than to things themselves; an example is “to respond to the largest of any collection of things.” Once more, it is a matter of empirical research to discover the limits of relations that a species is capable of responding to.
In summary, most animals organize the sensory world by a process of categorization, and from this basic mode of organization two further processes derive: differentiation or discrimination, and interrelating of categories or the perception of and tolerance for transformations（Chapter Seven）. In man these organizational activities are usually called
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